題目：Contract control and buyer–supplier conflicts: The moderating role of market and institutional environments
主講人：盛仕斌副教授（美國伯明翰阿拉巴馬大學(xué)）
時間：2014年4月28日 （星期一）下午2:00
地點：主樓216會議室
主講人簡介：
盛仕斌,美國阿拉巴馬大學(xué)伯明翰分校市場營銷學(xué)副教授。1996年本科畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)，2004年在美國弗吉尼亞理工大學(xué)獲市場營銷博士學(xué)位，后留美任教。盛博士的研究領(lǐng)域集中于營銷渠道，品牌戰(zhàn)略，新興經(jīng)濟體的市場營銷戰(zhàn)略等。盛博士已經(jīng)在市場營銷和管理學(xué)的國際主流雜志上發(fā)表二十多篇學(xué)術(shù)論文，包括Journal of Marketing, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Operations Management, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Business Research, Marketing Letters 等雜志。盛博士目前是多家國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊的編審委員會成員。盛博士曾擔(dān)任多所大學(xué)的訪問或兼職教授，包括香港城市大學(xué)，香港理工大學(xué)，法國Pierre-Mendès大學(xué)。盛博士目前是偉德國際1946bv官網(wǎng)管理與經(jīng)濟學(xué)院兼職教授。
內(nèi)容簡介：
Conflicts often occur in the supply chain, and reducing or resolving buyer–supplier conflicts is a pivotal task in supply chain management. However, extant studies find mixed effects of contract control on buyer–supplier conflicts. This study aims to resolve this controversy by introducing agency theory, which distinguishes between output-based and behavior-based contracts. Drawing on institutional theory, we develop a contingent perspective to examine the role of market and institutional factors in moderating the impact of contract control. The findings of an empirical study of buyer–supplier dyads in China show that contract control is both a source of and a resolution to buyer–supplier conflicts. Output-based contracts suppress buyer–supplier conflicts, whereas behavior-based contracts increase conflicts, and both effects depend on the institutional and market environment. Specifically, market uncertainty strengthens the role of output-based contracts in mitigating buyer–supplier conflicts but reduces the positive impact of behavior-based contracts. The positive relationship between behavior-based contracts and buyer–supplier conflicts is further attenuated by an effective legal system but strengthened by strong unilateral government support.
